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The United States adopted its first minimum income tax in 1969 in
response to reports that a few hundred high-income individuals had avoided paying
any income taxes. From these humble beginnings, the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) has grown to the point where it will soon raise taxes for millions of
Americans, many of them middle-income workers who weren’t the targets of the
original law.
While the AMT applied to 200,000 taxpayers in 1990, roughly 4 million
will pay it this year, according to the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. But that is
only the beginning. Under current law, the AMT rolls will explode to 22 million in
2007. The AMT’s revenue yield follows a similar pattern, having risen from $2 billion
in 1990 to $22 billion this year. It’s projected to nearly triple to $65 billion in 2007.1
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The AMT’s spread has added sub-
stantial complexity to the tax code,
imposing burdens on taxpayers and the
economy. A variety of reform options
could address these problems, but diffi-
cult choices would have to be made to
offset the resulting revenue losses.
The AMT’s Growing Reach 
The individual AMT is separate
from the regular individual income tax,
with different rates and rules (see box).2
The AMT taxes income at lower rates
than the regular system, primarily
because the first $62,550 of income is
tax-free in 2006.
At the same time, the AMT has a
broader base than the regular income
tax because it disallows some deduc-
tions, exemptions and credits, limiting
the extent to which they can be used
to reduce tax liability. Unlike the regu-
lar tax, the AMT doesn’t allow deduc-
tions for state and local taxes. Nor
does it permit a variety of itemized
deductions, including unreimbursed
job expenses and investment-related
expenses. The AMT doesn’t allow the
$3,300 personal exemption that taxpay-
ers, spouses and dependents receive
under the regular tax. These three
items accounted for most of the gap in
taxable income between the AMT and
the regular system, as reported by AMT
taxpayers in 2002 (Chart 1). 
Households must pay the larger
of the two tax bills. So the AMT kicks
in when the effects of its broader
base outweigh the impact of its lower
tax rates.
Through 2006, inflation has been
largely responsible for the spread of
the AMT. The regular system’s bracket
ranges are indexed to the Consumer
Price Index so that inflation doesn’t
push taxpayers into higher brackets.
But the AMT’s brackets aren’t indexed
to inflation. As the CPI has moved
upward, the AMT rates have risen
automatically relative to the regular
schedule, pushing more Americans into
the AMT.3
During the next four years, the
AMT’s spread will be largely driven by
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AMT: Broader Base, but Lower Rates
Under the regular income tax, taxpay-
ers subtract deductions and exemptions
from gross income to obtain taxable
income. A tax schedule then translates
taxable income into tax liability before
credits. Credits are then subtracted to
obtain the tax.
The AMT has the same basic struc-
ture, but with different rules at each
stage. There are a few differences in
how gross income is computed:
• Interest on private-activity munici-
pal bonds, such as those used to
finance industrial projects, is excluded
under the regular tax but included under
the AMT.
• In computing sole proprietors’ and
partners’ business income, the AMT
uses slower depreciation schedules and
puts more restrictions on the use of one
year’s losses to offset other years’
income.
• The AMT taxes holders of incentive
stock options when they exercise the
option, while the regular tax waits until
the stock is sold. 
Under the regular tax, taxpayers can
claim the larger of the itemized deduc-
tions or the standard deduction, which
is $10,300 for married couples. The
AMT has no standard deduction and
disallows some itemized deductions:
• State and local taxes cannot be
deducted.
• Only medical expenses exceeding
10 percent of income are deductible; the
regular-tax threshold is 7.5 percent. 
• Interest on home-equity loans can
be deducted only if the loan proceeds
are used for home improvements. 
• Miscellaneous itemized deductions,
including workers’ unreimbursed job
expenses, investment-related expenses
and attorney’s fees paid by winners of
some taxable damage awards, cannot be
claimed. The regular tax allows these
deductions if they exceed 2 percent of
income. 
On the other hand, the regular tax
starts phasing out some itemized deduc-
tions when income exceeds $150,500;
the AMT doesn’t impose the phaseout.
The regular tax allows a $3,300 per-
person exemption for the taxpayer,
spouse and each child, although the
exemptions are phased out at high
income levels. The AMT doesn’t allow the
exemptions. 
Although most taxpayers have larger
taxable income under the AMT than under
the regular tax rules, the AMT has a more
favorable tax schedule. The 2006 rates
are listed below. The 32.5 and 35 percent
brackets effectively phase out the benefits
of the $62,550 tax-free amount.*
<$62,550 0
$62,551 – $150,000  26%
$150,001 – $220,040  32.5%
$220,041 – $400,200  35%
>$400,200 28%
The AMT allows most of the regular
tax system’s major credits in 2006. The
main exception is that sole proprietors
and partners can’t claim business-related
credits, such as the low-income housing
credit. But they may be able to offset the
lost credits against their regular tax in
other years.
*Both the regular tax and the AMT provide a
special maximum rate of 15 percent for divi-
dends and long-term capital gains. Effective
rates may be higher due to interaction with
other tax provisions.3
recent tax cuts—the 2001 tax reduction
and subsequent legislation—with some
reinforcement from inflation. Tax
reductions that offer relief from the
regular income tax, without changing
the alternative tax, tend to expand the
AMT rolls by lowering some people’s
regular tax liability below their AMT
liability. This result can be offset, of
course, if the legislation also grants
AMT relief.
The recent tax cuts include sub-
stantial regular tax relief through 2010.
They also provide offsetting AMT relief,
but most of it is currently scheduled to
expire at the end of 2006. (Congress
has repeatedly extended the AMT relief
for a year or two at a time.) Starting
next year, the tax-free threshold falls
and many credits, such as those for
child care and higher education costs,
become unavailable under the AMT.4
The loss of credits and the
change in the two tax systems’ relative
tax rates are largely responsible for
next year’s sharp rise in the number
of Americans subject to the AMT. For
married couples in 2006, tax liability is
lower under the AMT than under the
regular system at any given level of
taxable income (Chart 2). The tax rate
gap in favor of the AMT is even larger
for unmarried taxpayers. 
In 2007, however, the annual
inflation adjustment pushes the regular
tax schedule down slightly, while the












Sources of Extra Taxable Income 
Reported by AMT Taxpayers, 2002
SOURCE: “AMT Preference Items, 2002,” by Leonard E. Burman and Troy Kravitz, Tax
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AMT Schedule Lies Below Regular Tax Schedule in 2006 but Moves Higher in 2007
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AMT schedule moves significantly
higher because the tax-free threshold
falls from $62,550 to $45,000. As a
result, the tax schedules are signifi-
cantly closer. Indeed, married couples’
AMT schedule lies slightly above the
regular tax schedule for taxable
incomes between $290,000 and
$346,000.
Looking farther ahead, the recent
tax cuts are scheduled to expire at the
The AMT kicks in when the
effects of its broader base
outweigh the impact of its 
lower tax rates.4 EconomicLetter FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
end of 2010. As regular tax liabilities
rise for many households, the AMT
rolls will sharply contract from 31 mil-
lion in 2010 to 17 million in 2011. But
the number of taxpayers affected by
the AMT will remain much larger than
today, reflecting the impact of infla-
tion. And the AMT rolls will further
rise to 28 million in 2015 as inflation
continues.
Congress has considered extend-
ing the tax cuts. Under this scenario,
the AMT would reach 34 million tax-
payers in 2011, growing to 46 million
in 2015 (Chart 3). 
Who Pays the AMT?
Any taxpayers affected by the
AMT’s restrictive rules face the risk of
having to pay it. They include work-
ers exercising incentive stock options
or paying unreimbursed job expenses,
holders of private-activity municipal
bonds, winners of certain taxable 
damage awards and investors in low-
income housing partnerships.
Residents of high-tax states may fall
into the AMT because it takes away
their state and local tax deductions.
Because the alternative system denies
personal exemptions for taxpayers,
spouses and children, larger families
are significantly more likely to pay the
AMT (Chart 4).
The likelihood of paying AMT is
greater at income levels where the
AMT schedule is high relative to the
regular rates. Taxpayers with incomes
of $200,000 to $500,000 (in 2005 dol-
lars) are most likely to pay AMT
because, as previously noted, that’s
where the difference in the two tax
schedules virtually disappears (Chart
5). The fraction of taxpayers in the
$100,000–$200,000 range paying AMT
also becomes quite high in 2010 and
2015.
Compared with unmarried taxpay-
ers, married couples face AMT sched-
ules that are less favorable relative to
the corresponding regular tax sched-
ule. As expected, couples are more
likely to pay the AMT (Chart 6). 
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Larger Families More 
Likely to Pay AMT
Households paying AMT (percent)
NOTE: The 2015 computations assume extension of the recent
tax cuts.
SOURCE: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Table T05-0086
(June 2005).
Chart 3
AMT Rolls Projected to 
Explode in 2007
AMT taxpayers (millions)
SOURCE: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Table T06-0083
(May 2006); authorÕs calculations.households using arcane loopholes to
escape tax liability. Their exposure
indicates that the AMT is reaching a
growing number of middle-income
taxpayers who haven’t engaged in tax
avoidance but have merely claimed
personal exemptions and other rou-
tine deductions. If current law remains
in place, they will be forced to deal
with the AMT and all of its complexity.
Complications Caused by the AMT
The AMT imposes significant com-
putational burdens on American house-
holds. The Form 1040 instructions ask
taxpayers to complete a 16-line work-
sheet to determine whether they
should compute the AMT on Form
6251. That form, in turn, has 55 lines,
accompanied by nine pages of turgid
instructions. Completing it often
requires revising schedules attached to
the regular tax return. Each year, mil-
lions of taxpayers slog through Form
6251 only to learn that they don’t owe
the AMT. 
The burdens extend to AMT tax-
payers who use business or capital
losses or foreign tax credits from other
years to reduce current tax liability.
They must make AMT computations
for those other years, even if they were
then on the regular tax.
The AMT and the regular tax
could have been made entirely sepa-
rate, with taxes computed from scratch
under each set of rules. But Congress
has provided for interaction between
the two systems, which can result in
anomalies. For example, because AMT
capital gains and dividend computa-
tions “borrow” a number from the cor-
responding regular tax computations
without accounting for the differences
between the systems, it’s possible for
tax liability to rise as more deductions
are claimed.5 Moveover, taxpayers
who claim the standard deduction for
regular income tax purposes can’t
itemize for AMT purposes, so some
taxpayers must itemize solely to avoid
AMT liability.
Another complication involves dif-
ferences in timing rules. If the regular
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Most Likely to Pay AMT
Households paying AMT (percent)
NOTE: The 2015 computations assume extension of the recent tax
cuts.


















Married Couples More 
Likely to Pay AMT
Households paying AMT (percent)
NOTE: Unmarried taxpayers caring for children are heads of house-
hold; other unmarried taxpayers are single. The 2015 computations
assume extension of the recent tax cuts.
SOURCE: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Table T05-0086 (June
2005).of taxpayers now facing exposure.
Supporters of this approach pro-
pose extending the AMT relief sched-
uled to expire at the end of 2006,
thereby forestalling the AMT explosion
slated for next year. They also general-
ly favor indexing the AMT brackets,
particularly the tax-free threshold, to
inflation. Some proponents would go
further and restore some of the deduc-
tions now disallowed by the AMT, such
as personal exemptions, state and local
taxes and unreimbursed job expenses. 
Other tax experts contend that the
complexity of two systems simply can’t
be justified. They acknowledge that the
regular tax includes some unwarranted
tax preferences but see selectively lim-
iting such preferences through a sec-
ond tax system as a poorly designed
remedy. Outright repeal of the AMT
has been endorsed by the Internal
Revenue Service’s National Taxpayer
Advocate, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation of the U.S.
Congress and the President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform.6
A few supporters of returning to a
single system suggest going in the
opposite direction—repealing the regu-
lar tax and retaining the AMT. A num-
ber of economists have long argued
that the best income tax is a broad-
based one with lower marginal tax
rates. At first glance, the AMT seems to
be exactly such a tax. Although there is
some truth to this observation, some
caveats should be noted. 
The AMT marginal tax rates aren’t
always that much lower than the regu-
lar tax’s marginal rates; sometimes, they
are actually higher (Chart 7). A large
portion of the AMT’s lower rates
reflects the tax-free threshold’s zero
rate. Once the AMT kicks in, the mar-
ginal rate jumps to 26 percent, well
above the regular system’s 15 percent.
The highest marginal rate under each
system is the same—35 percent. The
AMT applies its 35 percent marginal
rate to an intermediate income range—
$206,000 to $330,000 in 2007.7 At the
highest incomes, the AMT’s marginal
rate is indeed lower—28 percent rather
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tax allows an expense to be deducted
in an earlier year while the AMT
allows it to be deducted in a later year,
a taxpayer who is on the AMT in the
earlier year and on the regular tax in
the later year never deducts the item.
To provide relief for taxpayers in this
situation, Congress allows any AMT lia-
bility due to differences in timing rules
to be credited against future regular tax
liability to the extent that it exceeds
future AMT liability. But that requires
filling out Form 8801, which is 46 lines
long, with four pages of complicated
instructions. (The bulk of overall AMT
liability is due to lost deductions and
exemptions, rather than differences in
timing rules, and therefore can’t be
credited against future regular taxes.)
Having two tax systems also gives
rise to added tax planning. For exam-
ple, AMT taxpayers have an incentive
to shift payments of state and local
taxes and unreimbursed job expenses
into years in which they’re liable for
the regular tax.
The complexity of our two-head-
ed tax system has led to widespread—
perhaps universal—agreement that
reform is needed to prevent these bur-
dens from being imposed on additional
tens of millions of taxpayers.
Reform Options
Despite agreement on the need
for reform, a spirited debate rages
over what direction it should take.
Some tax experts call for retaining the
AMT but limiting its spread. Others
advocate returning to a single tax sys-
tem by repealing either the AMT or
the regular tax.
Those who favor keeping the AMT
contend it should apply to a small
number of higher income households
that use selected tax preferences, as
Congress originally intended. They see
the AMT as a useful step to address
unwarranted tax preferences that ineffi-
ciently divert resources to tax-favored
economic activities and unfairly favor
certain groups but that are too political-
ly popular to repeal. Adopting an alter-
native tax that denies these preferences
is one way to limit the savings taxpay-
ers can get from them. The advocates
of retaining the AMT agree, though,
that it shouldn’t cover the broad range
The complexity of our
two-headed tax 
system has led to 
widespread—perhaps
universal—agree-
ment that reform 
is needed.
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AMT Marginal Rate Can Be
Higher Than Regular-Tax
Marginal Rate
Marginal tax rate (percent)
NOTE: Regular tax schedule reflects assumed 3.9 percent inflation
adjustment from 2006 to 2007.than 35 percent. A recent study found
that being on the AMT raised marginal
tax rates for some taxpayers and low-
ered them for others.8
The treatment of state and local
taxes also affects the marginal tax rate.
Under the regular tax, effective margin-
al federal tax rates are somewhat
lower than the official rates because
state and local taxes are deductible.
Take a worker in the 35 percent regu-
lar income tax bracket facing a 6 per-
cent marginal state income tax rate.
His marginal federal rate is really only
32.9 percent because federal taxes
apply only to the 94 percent of income
left after paying state taxes. No similar
reduction occurs under the AMT
because it disallows state and local tax
deductions. 
The AMT’s base, moreover, isn’t
that much broader than the regular
system’s. Supporters of a broad-based,
low-rate income tax generally call for
the taxation of fringe benefits, govern-
ment transfer payments and interest on
municipal bonds. They even advocate
taxation of the rental value of owner-
occupied homes or, at least, repeal of
the mortgage-interest deduction. The
AMT does very little to fulfill this base-
broadening agenda.9
In some cases, the AMT’s base
may be too broad. Supporters of a
broad-based income tax agree that the
costs of earning income should be
deductible. Yet, the AMT denies
deductions for unreimbursed job
expenses and investment-related
expenses, and it taxes some lawsuit
winners’ damage awards with no
allowance for attorney’s fees. Denying
these deductions is inappropriate
unless the expenditures are actually
personal consumption rather than costs
of earning income. 
Another harsh feature of the AMT
has drawn some attention. Workers
who buy stock by exercising an incen-
tive stock option and later suffer a loss
can end up owing AMT on gains they
did not retain. Consider a worker who
exercises an incentive stock option,
paying $100,000 to buy shares worth
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$500,000. He later sells the stock after
its value falls to $200,000. Under the
regular tax, the worker pays tax on a
$100,000 capital gain at the time of
sale. Under the AMT, he owes tax on
$400,000 at the time he exercises the
option and has a $300,000 capital loss
at the time of sale. However, only
$3,000 a year of that loss can be
deducted against income other than
capital gains. Some workers at high-
tech firms, whose stock values plum-
meted after 2000, have AMT bills they
may never be able to pay.10
If a single tax system is adopted,
it should probably differ from the
AMT.11 It should also probably differ
from the regular income tax. Indeed,
many economists argue that the best
tax system is a consumption tax
because it eliminates the income tax’s
penalty on saving. Under that criteri-
on, both the regular income tax and
the AMT fall short.
Policymakers have failed to adopt
a long-term solution to the AMT prob-
lem, although they have repeatedly
extended AMT relief for a year or two
at a time. Disagreement over the best
way to reform the AMT is one reason
policymakers have been slow to act.
But the budgetary implications may be
even more important. 
As the AMT spreads, it will bring
in large amounts of revenue (Chart 8).
It is projected to generate 9 percent of
individual income tax revenue in 2010,
increasing to 12 percent in 2015 if the
tax cuts are extended. AMT repeal
would require the government to forgo
this revenue, a difficult prospect at a
time of large budget deficits. Revenue
losses from limiting the spread of the
AMT, rather than repealing it, would be
smaller, but not by much.
If Congress extends the tax cuts
beyond 2010, the AMT raises more rev-
enue and reforms impose larger rev-
enue losses. In general, a commitment
to prevent the spread of the AMT
means that the budgetary cost of regu-
lar tax relief includes both its direct
revenue losses and those from the
required offsetting AMT relief. 
Addressing the revenue loss from
AMT repeal requires a choice between
paying now and paying later. Failing to














AMT revenue (billions of dollars)
SOURCE: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Table T06-0083
(May 2006); authorÕs calculations.
Disagreement over 
the best way to
reform the AMT is 
one reason 
policymakers have
been slow to act.
But the budgetary
implications may 
be even more 
important.in still greater government borrowing,
forcing spending cuts or tax hikes in
the future. Replacing the revenue
would require spending cuts or tax
hikes today. 
Little political support exists for
large spending cuts. On the revenue
side, an AMT offset might include
increases in marginal income tax
rates. For example, a one-tenth
increase in marginal rates could
replace AMT revenue in 2010.12 Of
course, higher marginal tax rates can
have undesirable economic effects.
Another way to increase revenues
would be to remove unjustified prefer-
ences from the regular tax system. In
its income-tax reform option, for exam-
ple, the President’s Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform suggested repeal-
ing the AMT and replacing part of its
revenue by revoking the regular sys-
tem’s state and local tax deduction,
which the panel viewed as unjustified.
Another approach would combine
AMT repeal with a sweeping tax
reform that includes at least a partial
move to consumption taxation, as the
panel suggested in its second reform
option. Any such reform would involve
difficult and controversial trade-offs. 
Faced with these unpalatable
options, policymakers have delayed
addressing the AMT problem. Surely,
though, the time has come to fix a tax
system that everyone agrees is broken. 
Viard is a senior economist and research 
officer in the Research Department of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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paying AMT.
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relief; they allow the $1,000 child credit, the
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by Kris Hill, Tax Notes, April 5, 2004, pp.
119–22.
6 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual
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on Taxation of the U.S. Congress, April 2001;
Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System, President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform, November 2005.
7 As previously noted, this anomaly occurs
because the tax-free amount is being phased out
over this income range.
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